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Never partnered: A multilevel analysis of lifelong singlehood
Daniela Bellani1
Gøsta Esping-Andersen2
Lesia Nedoluzhko2
Abstract
BACKGROUND
Lifelong singlehood is a comparatively rare demographic phenomenon, averaging about
5% across the European Union. However, levels of lifelong singlehood vary greatly
between countries in Europe. What explains this variation? Our main thesis is that it
reflects the prevailing norms regarding gender roles. We hypothesize that in societies
that have not adapted to women’s new roles there will be a greater propensity toward
lifelong singlehood, especially among highly educated women.
OBJECTIVE
We analyze the link between levels of gender egalitarianism and the probability of
lifelong singlehood, both overall and by educational attainment.
METHODS
We apply multilevel modeling to European Social Survey (ESS) and European Values
Study (EVS) data collected between 2002 and 2014. We focus on differences in
nonpartnering across levels of education. We run separate models for men and women.
RESULTS
In  support  of  our  hypothesis,  our  analysis  reveals  an  inverse  U-shaped  relationship
between levels of gender equity and the likelihood of lifelong singlehood for women.
The association is particularly marked for more highly educated women, while it is
linear for low-educated men.
CONCLUSIONS
Our results suggest that high levels of singlehood are concentrated very much within
those societies where traditional gender values have waned but gender egalitarianism
remains poorly diffused. Where gender egalitarianism has become normatively
1 Universitat Pompeu Farba, Barcelona, Spain. E-Mail: daniela.bellani@upf.edu.
2 Universitat Pompeu Farba, Barcelona, Spain.
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dominant, we find higher levels of partnering for better-educated women and for low-
educated men.
CONTRIBUTION
Our study contributes to the limited research on singlehood as well as to the growing
body of literature on the demographic consequences of the ongoing revolution in
women’s roles.
1. Introduction
Single-person households are increasingly widespread, driven primarily by young
people leaving the parental home, high divorce risks, and population aging (Fokkema
and Liefbroer 2008). In this study we focus on lifelong singlehood in Europe. Lifelong
singles (also referred to as the ‘never partnered’ and the ‘permanently single’) are
defined as individuals who have not experienced a coresidential partnership (either
marriage or cohabitation) by the age of 40.3 As we shall see, they represent about 5% in
Europe, ranging from below 3% in Denmark to a high of 10% in Ireland and Italy (our
elaboration on ESS data).
Permanent singlehood can have important implications for people in terms of
emotional and economic support, well-being, and health. Single people are more
exposed to loneliness and, since they are not emotionally and economically supported
by a partner, they are more likely to experience psychological and material
disadvantages, especially in old age (Pinquart and Sörensen 2011; Kalmijn 2013).
Demographic and sociological studies on this topic are few and far between (Wiik
and Dommermuth 2014) and, like Kiernan’s (2002, 2004), they tend to be
predominantly explorative. Recent exceptions are the studies of Dykstra and Poortman
(2010) and Wiik and Dommermuth (2014), both of which focus on the socioeconomic
correlates of never partnering (in the Netherlands and Norway respectively). We follow
a similar explorative approach, but rather than focusing on a single country we study
3 See  below  for  a  more  detailed  definition.  In  this  study  partnerships  (or  unions)  refer  to  marriages  and
cohabitation. One variant of partnership that our data cannot identify is living apart together (LAT). Although
LAT has become quite common (between 5% and 10%) in most European societies during the last decades
(Liefbroer, Poortman, and Seltzer 2015), our inability to identify it is unlikely to influence our results in any
major way. Several studies show that LAT is quite distinct from singlehood, representing primarily a stage in
union formation dynamics. It tends to occur after the dissolution of a previous union (or spousal death) and in
the majority of cases people intend to live together in the future (Liefbroer, Poortman, and Seltzer 2015;
Evertsson and Nyman 2013; De Jong Gierveld 2004).
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lifelong singlehood and its educational gradient across a large number of European
countries.4
Recent research has documented an increase in singlehood across countries (e.g.,
Fokkema and Liefbroer 2008). Indeed, this is what one would predict from Becker’s
(1981) framework, in which the primary utility of partnering derives from gender role
specialization. Accordingly, if men’s and women’s market productivity begins to
converge, the raison d’être of union formation weakens. There is ample empirical
support for this prediction (Brines and Joyner 1999; Blossfeld and Timm 2003). The
choice of singlehood, it is argued, is a by-product of women’s greater earning capacity
and, consequently, of less reliance on a male partner’s earnings (Oppenheimer 1997).
Several studies have actually established that nonpartnering is especially likely among
higher-educated women. It is similarly likely among low-educated men, whose earning
capacity has declined over the past decades (Blossfeld and Drobnic 2001; Kalmijn
2011; Wiik 2009).
But recent evidence suggests that the association between individuals’ resources
and partnering has weakened in some countries, and that the educational gradient of
singlehood has turned from being positive to being null (or negative) for women, and
from negative to null for men. In some countries the likelihood of partnering among
higher-educated career women has increased (Domínguez-Folgueras and Castro-Martín
2008). In parallel, research indicates that men’s earning potential is ever less crucial in
women’s decision to partner (Sweeney 2002). Other attributes, such as companionship
or involvement in domestic work, are gaining ground (Dykstra and Poortman 2010).
We need an adequate theoretical framework in order to explain why permanent
singlehood varies substantially across countries – both overall and by level of
education. The multiple equilibrium framework espoused by Esping-Andersen (2009)
and Esping-Andersen and Billari (2015) hypothesizes a U-shaped relationship between
gender role change and partnering (as well as fertility and union stability).5 It predicts
that distinct stages in the transition from a traditional to a gender symmetric partnership
model are associated with different demographic responses. Accordingly, a greater
propensity toward partnering is to be expected where the traditional male-breadwinner
norm remains dominant. In contrast, pervasive normative uncertainty and no significant
adaptation to women’s new roles are likely to prevail across the initial phase of the
female revolution. Under such conditions we should expect a rise in the likelihood of
being single. But where gender egalitarianism has gained dominance, we should see a
return to higher odds of partnering. Put differently, lifelong singlehood is likely to be
4 The educational gradient of lifelong singlehood refers to the relationship between levels of education and the
likelihood of remaining single. It can be positive (the higher-educated are more likely to remain single) or
vice versa.
5 Aassve et al. (2015) apply a very similar approach to ours but focus on fertility outcomes.
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especially pronounced in societies in the midst of a transition from one dominant
partnership norm to another.
The multiple equilibrium framework predicts that the higher-educated will
spearhead gender egalitarianism, which will become ever more universal as the
diffusion process reaches maturity (Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015). Accordingly, if
gender egalitarianism exerts a major influence on union formation, in the countries
experiencing the transition phase this is likely to produce highly stratified patterns in
the marriage market. Here the combination of enhanced female economic autonomy
and male adaptation lagging behind implies a greater likelihood of lifelong singlehood.
This should especially be the case for the higher-educated. Where gender egalitarianism
approaches universality we should – all things being equal – expect a lower propensity
toward being lifelong single, and also more similarity in partnering probability across
education levels. Where both female employment and gender egalitarianism flourish,
the opportunity cost of partnering (compared to singlehood) should be lower –
especially for higher-educated women. As a consequence, the effect of women’s
education on partnering should diminish in tandem with the spread of gender-
egalitarian norms. In parallel, this should also improve the partnering prospects for low-
educated males, assuming of course that they have effectively adopted gender-
symmetric practices.
This study contributes to the now ample research that links demographic behavior
with gender relations, as well as to the scarce comparative literature on never
partnering. We exploit variations in the propensity toward permanent singlehood across
European countries for the years 2002–2014, which we subdivide into two periods.6
Our aim is to identify whether there is a link between levels of gender egalitarianism
and the likelihood of being lifelong single – both overall and by levels of education.
Our  data  does  not  allow  for  analyzing  major  changes  across  longer  periods  or  more
cohorts within countries. This implies that the primary source of variation is found in
the cross-country dimension.
2. Education, gender roles, and partnering
Identifying the educational gradient of lifelong singlehood is fundamental if we want to
understand its stratified dimensions. Education reflects not only a person’s income
potential (Card 1999) but also their sociocultural resources, which in turn influence
6 By distinguishing time periods we trace period changes to a certain degree. However, as we explain below,
in some countries we observe no substantial change in gender norms over these years. Another limitation of
our study is that our data does not permit us to identify whether lifelong singlehood is the result of choice or
constraints.
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opportunities and constraints related to family life (McLanahan 2004; Brand and Davis
2011).
It is well established that the effect of education on partnering differs for men and
women (e.g., Goldin 2004; Goldstein and Kenney 2001). Higher education has
traditionally given men an advantage in the marriage market, while this is not
necessarily the case for women.
Within the New Home Economics (Becker 1981), the educational gradient of
partnering – negative for women and positive for men – “makes sense.” According to
Becker (1981), any given person is more likely to select a partner who commands
resources that are complementary to his or her own. The partner with inferior earnings
prospects should therefore specialize in home production. Although in principle the
Becker approach is gender neutral, it is usually assumed that for women the opportunity
costs of household work are lower than for men. This implies that women are expected
to specialize in the domestic sphere and men in the labor market. Accordingly, women
will tend to compete for men with good earnings prospects (e.g., Dykstra and Poortman
2010; Kalmijn 2013).
Within Becker’s framework, career-oriented women (i.e., women with higher
education), as well as low-educated men, should have a comparatively greater
probability of remaining permanently single. In contrast, the marriage market should
favor higher-educated men.
Hypothesis 1: We would expect to find that, overall, highly educated women and
low-educated men are the most likely to remain permanently single.
2.1 Gender egalitarianism and singlehood
The New Home Economics perspective has been questioned on both theoretical and
empirical grounds. For one thing, female careers and family formation are not
necessarily incompatible if public institutions provide adequate family–work balance
policies (e.g., McDonald 2000). In parallel, as many have argued, male adaptation to
women’s new roles is also a fundamental precondition for reconciling female careers
with partnership and motherhood (Esping-Andersen 2009; Kalmijn 2013; Esping-
Andersen and Billari 2015; Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015).
Some, such as Kalmijn (2013), assume a linear relationship between gender
egalitarianism and the propensity toward lifelong singlehood. The multiple equilibrium
framework, which is the theoretical referent of our study, posits an inverse curvilinear
effect (Esping-Andersen 2009; Esping-Andersen and Billari 2015).
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The multiple equilibrium framework predicts a low probability of never partnering
where the conventional male-breadwinner model (i.e., women invest primarily in
unpaid work and men in paid work) remains dominant. Here specialized gender roles
imply that both men and women rely on being, and are expected to be, partnered
(Parsons and Bales 1955).
In societies where the female revolution has progressed only partially we should,
in contrast, observe an increase in the odds of permanent singlehood. This is where we
should expect role disjuncture: while women increasingly invest in marketable skills
and careers, male adaptation in the domestic sphere lags behind (Esping-Andersen and
Billari 2015). Ambiguity regarding the proper role of women is likely to have
repercussions  for  partnership  formation.  Women  may  refrain  from  partnering  if  it  is
seen as an obstacle to their career or as a potential source of marital tension and conflict
(Bertrand, Kamenica, and Pan 2013). The prospects of a suboptimal life as a couple
may accordingly bias women’s choices in favor of singlehood. And this in turn will also
affect men’s partnering chances negatively.
We should, in contrast, expect to see a decline of lifelong singlehood in societies
where  adaptation  to  women’s  new  roles  is  more  advanced,  be  it  in  terms  of  gender
attitudes or gender symmetry in the domestic sphere. A high level of gender
egalitarianism is expected to lessen the penalties faced by men who increase their
commitment in childrearing and to engage in traditionally female domestic activities
(Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård 2015; Sevilla-Sanz 2010). This should
weaken the trade-offs between the home and the market for women, resulting in
increased gains from partnering. And this should translate into better partnering chances
for men too.
Hypothesis 2: We expect to find an inverse U-shaped relationship between gender-
egalitarian attitudes and permanent singlehood. Where either traditional or gender-
egalitarian attitudes are dominant the probability of permanent singlehood will be
comparatively low.
2.2 The educational gradient of lifelong singlehood
Research  has  documented  a  shift  in  the  educational  gradient  of  partnering  in  some
societies but not in others. In the Nordic countries highly educated women are more
likely to be in a union compared to their less-educated counterparts (Goldscheider,
Turcotte, and Kopp 2001; Heard 2011; Thornton, Axinn, and Teachman 1995; Torr
2011). Better-educated men here are also as likely to remain single as the less-educated
are (see Dykstra and Poortman 2010 for the Netherlands and Wiik and Dommermuth
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2014 for Norway). However, in other countries the negative educational gradient of
partnering appears to persist (Kalmijn 2013).
Within the multiple equilibrium framework, the educational gradient of partnering
should be associated with differences in gender role attitudes. Where traditional gender
norms dominate, one should observe a lower probability of being lifelong single for
highly educated men – due primarily to their strong earnings prospects. A similar logic
should apply for the low partnership prospects of low educated men. On the female side
of the coin, in gender-traditional societies one should observe a similar partnering
propensity across all levels of education. Here lower-educated women face a high
economic price for singlehood, while higher-educated women mainly face a greater
social price – remaining single will, in such a context, be regarded as deviant from the
norm (DePaulo and Morris 2006).
In the early phases of the gender role transition, the educational gradient of
lifelong singlehood for women is expected to shift. Where women’s new role in the
labor market is not accompanied by male adaptation in the domestic sphere, partnering
will be seen as less attractive, in particular for career women. As a consequence, in such
societies we should expect a greater likelihood of higher-educated women remaining
single, both because they perceive the greatest family–work conflict and because they
are better positioned to support themselves as singles. And since female employment
implies less reliance on male income, the comparative marriage market disadvantage
for low-educated men should decline. Hence, the educational gradient for men is
expected to weaken.
Where gender egalitarianism has become the norm across the entire social
spectrum, the educational differentials in partnering should narrow. In a context where
virtually all married women are employed throughout their lifetime, men’s chances of
entering  into  a  union will  depend very  much on their  inclination  to  take  on  their  fair
share of household work (Sevilla-Sanz 2010). This in turn should diminish the negative
educational gradient for men. And in this context the conventional rationale behind
partnering should give way to a greater emphasis on prospective partner characteristics
that may be deemed important for consumption maximization, social life, or other
valued goals (Fernández, Guner, and Knowles 2005). Accordingly, men may
increasingly compete for women with strong economic resources (Oppenheimer 1988;
Oppenheimer and Lew 1995; Sweeney 2002; Schwartz 2010) and this should lessen the
positive educational gradient of lifelong singlehood for women.
Hypothesis 3: We hypothesize that better-educated women should have a
comparatively high probability of being lifelong single in societies characterized
by a medium level of gender egalitarianism. However, in countries at a very
advanced stage of gender egalitarianism we should expect convergence in the odds
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of being lifelong single across educational levels of women. Where gender
egalitarianism approaches universal acceptance, we also expect to find better
partnering opportunities for low educated men.
3. Data, variables, and methodology
We exploit European Social Survey (ESS) data for 2002, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012,
and 2014 waves, and European Value Study (EVS) data for 2008–2009. Since the
sampling frame and the variables of interest are similar, we pool the two datasets. By
doing so, we obtain larger national samples that allow us to make comparisons between
subgroups broken down by individual characteristics, such as education and gender.7
We compare individuals who are or who have been in a coresidential partnership
(marriage and/or cohabitation) with those who have never been partnered (defined as
lifelong single). We split the sample by gender and estimate multilevel models. The
data from both surveys have a hierarchical, multilevel structure. We consider two levels
where individuals are nested within country–period combinations (i.e., level-two units).
We restrict our analysis to women and men aged 40–55 between 2002 and 2014.
Since the time interval spans more than one decade we split it into two subperiods:
2002–2009 and 2010–2014.8 This  implies  that  for  the  first  period  respondents  were
born between 1947 and 1968 (the average being around 1958) and for the second
between 1955 and 1974 (the average being around 1964). Our analysis is focused on
EU countries  but  also  includes  Iceland,  Norway,  Switzerland,  and Ukraine.  For  some
countries we have data for only one period. Greece, Latvia, Lithuania, and Romania are
not included for both periods due to missing information on key variables. In total we
have 54 country–period combinations (see Table A-1 in the Appendix).
3.1 Dependent variable: Lifelong singlehood
The dependent variable identifies individuals who by age 40–55 have never lived in a
coresidential union.9 As in earlier studies, we choose age 40 as the threshold after which
7 Since the lifelong single population is quite small, any detailed analysis requires very large sample sizes. For
this reason we have pooled the two datasets. In Tables A-8 and A-9 we present results using only ESS.
8 We are compelled to estimate with a period dummy rather than a continuous time specification since for
many countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the
Netherlands, Portugal, and Ukraine) we do not have more than one observation by period on (one or more)
variables at the aggregate level.
9 In the ESS Round 3 (2006) the question we use to construct our dependent variable defines this as no
partnership experience lasting more than three months.
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an individual is likely to remain single permanently (Dykstra and Poortman 2010). To
obtain a more homogeneous population we exclude persons over the age of 55.
Lifelong singlehood status is identified by answers to questions such as “Could I
ask about your current legal marital status?”, “Have you ever lived with a partner
without being married?”, “Are you or have you ever been married?”, and “Have you
ever been divorced or had a civil union dissolved?” Our dependent variable assumes the
value of 0 if the respondent is (or has been) in a partnership and the value of 1 if not. In
total the pooled dataset includes 45,092 women and 38,887 men. The mean level of
lifelong singlehood is 4.2% (n=1,887) for women and 7.3% (n=2,830) for men.10
A descriptive overview suggests a degree of country clustering (Figure 1). In one
cluster we find the Mediterranean countries (Italy, Portugal, Spain, and Greece), with
high rates of male and female singlehood. This is also the case for the Anglo-Saxon
countries (especially Ireland), and Slovakia, Croatia, and Bulgaria. In contrast, the
Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Iceland – but not Finland) and some
Eastern European countries (Romania and Hungary) exhibit low rates for both men and
women. Here, on average, the rate of lifelong singlehood for men is between 3.2% and
5.5% and for women between 1.5% and 2.7%. This group is followed by the majority
of the continental European countries (Germany, France, Switzerland, Belgium, and
Luxembourg), with medium levels – the male rate is between about 6% and 7% and the
female rate between 3% and 4%. Yet another group, which includes Lithuania, Latvia,
and Slovenia, is characterized by a gender mismatch of singlehood (high for women,
low for men).
10 We exclude ESS data on France (waves 2002 and 2004), Finland and Ireland (wave 2010), and the Czech
Republic (wave 2012) because of the high percentage of missing values on our key variables.
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Figure 1: Mean lifelong singlehood rates in Europe, ESS 2002–2014 and EVS
2008–2009, pooled dataset
a) Women
b) Men
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3.2 Explanatory variables
At the individual level, our main explanatory variable is the respondent’s level of
education. For reasons of parsimony we distinguish three categories, using the
International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED). The first represents lower
secondary education or below (ISCED 0–2), the second represents upper secondary
education (ISCED 3–4), and the third represents tertiary education (ISCED 5–6). The
descriptive statistics in Table 1 show that roughly 23.3% of women and 21.2% of men
fall  into  the  first  category;  49.8%  of  women  and  54%  of  men  into  the  second;  and
26.9% of women and 24.8% of men into the third.
Table 1: Description of the individual-level variables for women and men aged
40–55, ESS 2002–2014 and EVS 2008–2009, pooled data
Women Men
Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max.
Lifelong (LL) singlehood
Not LL single 95.82% 92.72%
LL single 4.18% 7.28%
Age 47.45 4.62 40.00 55.00 47.47 4.61 40.00 55.00
Education
Lower sec. or below 23.28% 21.19%
Upper sec. 49.80% 53.97%
Tertiary 26.92% 24.84%
Dataset
ESS 86.24% 87.45%
EVS 13.76% 12.55%
Immigrant status
Native 91.08% 91.32%
Immigrant 8.92% 8.68%
Religiosity
Without religious
background 36.38% 41.07%
With religious
background 63.62% 58.93%
N 45,092 38,887
As in Kalmijn (2013), our models control for age (a continuous variable),
immigrant status, and religiosity. They control also for the data source (either ESS or
EVS). All covariates refer to the time of the interview. Religiosity is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports being (or having been) a member of a
particular religion or denomination. Immigrant status (also a dummy) indicates whether
a person is foreign-born. We include a variable for the respective dataset because of
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slight differences in the definition of lifelong singlehood between the EVS and ESS
(see Table A-2).11 All control variables were measured identically in the two datasets.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the independent variables for lifelong singlehood.
Here we note a higher incidence of lifelong singlehood among low-educated men
(11.4%) – almost twice the level of the highly educated. For women, it is higher for
tertiary-educated (5.3%) than for other educational groups (4.5% for low-educated and
3.4% for medium-educated women). These distributions are very much in line with
earlier studies (Blossfeld and Timm 2003).
Table 2: Distribution of independent variables by respondent’s partnership
status for women and men aged 40–55, ESS 2002–2014 and EVS
2008–2009, pooled data
Women Men
Not LL single LL single Not LL single LL single
Education
Lower sec. or below 95.5% 4.5% 88.6% 11.4%
Upper sec. 96.6% 3.4% 93.5% 6.5%
Tertiary 94.7% 5.3% 94.5% 5.5%
Dataset
ESS 96.0% 4.0% 92.8% 7.2%
EVS 94.8% 5.2% 91.9% 8.1%
Immigrant status
Native 95.7% 4.3% 92.4% 7.6%
Immigrant 96.5% 3.5% 96.0% 4.0%
Religiosity
Without religious background 96.2% 3.8% 93.0% 7.0%
With religious background 95.6% 4.4% 92.5% 7.5%
Total 95.8% 4.2% 92.7% 7.3%
3.3 Macro variables
Since we primarily focus on between-country variability, we include indicators related
to attitudinal and structural variations across countries, in particular those that help
capture gender norms.
11 In a preliminary analysis we also tested for the impact of other variables (living in an Eastern or Western
European country and health status). To obtain a parsimonious model we have included only variables that
have any significant impact on the probability of remaining single.
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Following earlier research (Arpino, Esping-Andersen, and Pessin 2015), we use
one indicator of gender equity attitudes, constructed from interviewee (aged 18–55)
responses in two pooled surveys, the World Values Study and EVS. 12 The question was
worded as follows: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than
women.” The three possible responses were “disagree,” “agree,” and “neither agree nor
disagree.” We opt for this particular indicator because, as Seguino (2007) argues, it is
the one attitudinal question which unambiguously taps into gender equity in the
treatment of women and men (see also Davis and Greenstein 2009).
To construct this variable we first recorded individual responses in a dummy
variable, in which “disagree” is coded as 1 (i.e., representing gender equity orientation),
whereas the other two responses are coded as 0. We then calculated the percentage of
respondents expressing gender-equitable attitudes for each country and for two periods,
1989–1998 and 1999–2009,13 which roughly coincide with the time when our
respondents were almost at peak partnering ages. We label the resulting variable as
‘gender equity.’14 In our models this variable is measured in both linear and quadratic
form.15
Table 3 presents the incidence of gender equity across countries. One notes
substantial cross-country variation (here the values are averaged over the two periods
considered). In Scandinavia 90+% of respondents support gender equity; in Finland the
level is somewhat lower (about 80%). The Nordic countries, and Denmark in particular,
appear in this respect to have moved decisively toward gender-egalitarian value
dominance – gender egalitarianism is close to universal (95%). Coincidentally, in
Denmark (as in Sweden) the incidence of lifelong singlehood for women (around 1.5%)
is exceptionally low.
Note that in some Eastern European countries, such as Romania and Ukraine, we
also find very low levels of lifelong singlehood, notwithstanding comparatively low
levels of support for gender equity (around 50%). This contrasts with the Mediterranean
countries, which are characterized by high rates of lifelong singlehood and medium to
low levels of gender equity. In some countries, such as Austria, Belgium, France, and
Hungary, we observe substantial variation over time on this indicator.
12 We refer to gender equity and not to gender equality since the theory we are testing predicts that fairness of
treatment for women and men (gender equity) and not (necessarily) equality in outcomes in education or the
labor market (gender equality) affects demographic behavior. For a more detailed discussion, see Arpino,
Esping-Andersen, and Pessin (2015).
13 In Tables A-12 and A-13 we show results of models using two restricted periods, 1989–1992 and 1993–
1999.
14 Although we use this variable to capture the degree to which gender egalitarianism has spread in any given
society, we prefer to label it as ‘gender equity’ because it taps into notions of fairness. In Tables A-14 and
A-15 we present the results of models using an alternative index based on three indicators of gender equity.
15 In this paper we present graphs based on the results of the quadratic model only because of the better fit.
The correlation matrix for all macro-level variables employed in our analysis is presented in Table A-3.
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Table 3: Description of macro-level variables
Gender equity
First period Second period
Austria (AT) 49.21% 67.19%
Belgium (BE) 57.47% 80.85%
Bulgaria (BG) 47.23% 56.96%
Switzerland (CH) 60.83% 75.29%
Czech Republic (CZ) 45.60% 66.32%
Germany (DE) 67.03% 65.87%
Denmark (DK) 93.37% 95.58%
Estonia (EE) 52.35% 75.64%
Spain (ES) 67.72% 76.33%
Finland (FI) 76.74% 87.08%
France (FR) 63.22% 79.68%
United Kingdom (GB) 73.10% 81.15%
Greece (GR) – 71.33%
Croatia (HR) 48.33% 80.52%
Hungary (HU) 52.50% 76.05%
Ireland (IE) 66.95% 78.94%
Iceland (IS) 93.11% 96.56%
Italy (IT) 53.51% 68.11%
Lithuania (LT) – 66.11%
Latvia (LV) 54.22% –
Netherlands (NL) 77.91% 88.58%
Norway (NO) 85.16% 93.62%
Poland (PL) 40.19% 59.02%
Portugal (PT) 59.95% 68.03%
Romania (RO) 41.83% –
Sweden (SE) 92.79% 96.06%
Slovenia (SI) 63.11% 79.49%
Slovakia (SK) 37.92% 57.22%
Ukraine (UA) 47.57% 59.14%
Total 61.81% 75.80%
At the macro level we construct a variable representing the female–male ratio in
tertiary education by birth cohort. This should help capture imbalances in the marriage
market which in turn may influence partnering choices or constraints (Esteve, Garcia-
Roman, and Permanyer 2012). A reversal of the traditional sex ratio in tertiary
education may increase the likelihood of female singlehood. Utilizing Barro and Lee’s
(2013) data, we measure the gender ratio dividing the percentage of tertiary-educated
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women over tertiary-educated men within each five-year birth cohort.16 All  country-
level variables are standardized so that our results apply to the average country.
3.4 Method
We use multilevel models (Snijders and Bosker 1999) to examine the impact of
education  on  the  likelihood  of  remaining  single  and  to  get  a  better  idea  about  the
complex processes underlying marriage market choices at both individual and societal
levels.
We distinguish two levels of analysis: individuals at level 1 and country–periods at
level 2. 17 Since gender equity varies between countries and periods (the former being
the most important source of variation), the second level in the multilevel analysis is
constituted by the combination of country and period. If we do not allow the score of
this  indicator  to  vary  across  both  country  and  period,  we  risk  underestimating  the
standard  errors.  Hence,  each  country–period  combination  is  a  unit  observation  at  the
second level. Our random effects approach corrects standard errors for both sources of
clustering.
Estimation is based on two-level logistic regression models (e.g., Rabe-Hesketh
and Skrondal 2012). We present coefficients with their standard errors and the second-
level standard deviation of the random effect. We standardize the variables at the
aggregate level. Given that we include a cross-level interaction between level of
education and gender equity, we allow the effect of education to vary across country–
periods. We report results separately for men and women since we expect relevant
gender differences with respect to the educational gradient.
We first estimate empty multilevel models, looking at the likelihood of being
single without including any variable at either individual or aggregate level. Then we
include only individual-level characteristics. In the third step we test a model with the
equity indicator variable, controlling also for the sex ratio of higher educational
attainment. In the final step we add interactions.
16 As a robustness check we control also for the female graduation rate by country and cohort (see Tables
A-10 and A-11).
17 Due to the nature of the data, we did additional robustness checks using three levels: individuals, country–
periods, and country (see Tables A-4–A-7).
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4. Empirical results
The empty models in Tables 4 and 5 (Model 1) confirm that lifelong singlehood varies
substantially across country–periods. Figure 2 explores this variation in more depth,
showing the estimated residuals for all the units at the second level. For a substantial
number of units the 95% confidence interval does not overlap with the horizontal line at
zero (i.e., the second-level average). This indicates that units differ from each other,
since the confidence intervals of estimated residuals represented by the bars are often
above or below the zero line. This is the case for both men and women.
Panels a) and b) of Figure 2 indicate that there are a number of countries, such as
Sweden  and  Denmark  for  women  and  Latvia  and  Denmark  for  men  during  the  first
decade of 21st century, in which individuals are significantly less likely to experience
lifelong singlehood. The largest country-level residual for lifelong singlehood is found
for women in Italy (in the first decade of 21st century) and for men in Ireland (during
the second decade).
Figure 2: Caterpillar plot of random intercept predictions and 95% confidence
intervals versus ranking
a) Women aged 40–55
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Figure 2: (Continued)
b) Men aged 40–55
4.1 The educational gradient of lifelong singlehood
We first estimate the education effects across country–periods without the macro-level
variables (Tables 4 and 5, Model 2). We subsequently present estimations that take into
account the macro-level variables (Tables 4 and 5, Models 3 and 4). Finally, we include
interactions for levels of education with the gender equity variable (Table 6 for women
and Table 7 for men).
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that education has a strong effect in all model
specifications, for men as well as for women. More specifically, the inclusion of the
individual-level control variables confirms that the level of education is positively
related to lifelong singlehood for women, while the opposite is true for men: that is,
more highly educated men are less likely to remain lifelong unpartnered.
To facilitate interpretation, we plot the predicted probabilities by educational level
in Figure 3. Beginning with women, the predicted probability of remaining lifelong
single for those with tertiary education is the highest (about 5.5%). The predicted
probability for the other educational groups is significantly lower (about 3.5% for those
with medium or low levels of education).
We observe exactly the opposite for men. The highest predicted probability of
lifelong singlehood is found among the low-educated (about 11%), while those with
high and medium levels of education have a significantly smaller propensity (between
about 5% and 6%). Our first hypothesis about the educational gradient of lifelong
singlehood is therefore supported by our results.
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Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of lifelong singlehood by education with 95%
confidence intervals
a) Women b) Men
We then estimate multilevel models to test hypothesis 2: that the probability of
being lifelong single varies by the degree of diffusion of gender equity. Here we add
characteristics at the country–period level to the baseline specification.
Model 3 in Tables 4 and 5 for women and men respectively show that the greater
the diffusion of gender equity, the lower the likelihood of being lifelong single among
both men and women. This holds also when we control for individual characteristics
and for the female–male ratio of university graduates. However, as will be recalled, our
hypothesis predicts an inverted U-shaped function. And indeed the estimations show a
better fit when we additionally include a squared term of the gender equity variable.
Model 4 in Tables 4 and 5 for women and men respectively show an odds ratio for the
squared gender equity variable of 0.999 (with p<0.01 for women and p<0.05 for men).
This suggests an initially positive relationship between the level of gender equity and
the predicted probability of being lifelong single. But as gender egalitarianism
approaches dominant status the relationship turns negative – among both men and
women.
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Table 4: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood,
women, odds ratios
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.091 1.094 1.090
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Tertiary 1.660*** 1.666*** 1.665***
(0.095) (0.096) (0.096)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.512*** 1.493*** 1.512***
(0.114) (0.113) (0.114)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.765*** 0.767*** 0.763***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.162** 1.159** 1.160**
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Age 0.991* 0.994 0.994
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.121 1.125
(0.090) (0.088)
Gender equity 0.991* 0.993*
(0.005) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999***
(0.000)
Constant 0.040*** 0.030*** 0.026*** 0.032***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.476*** 0.495*** 0.481*** 0.422***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.051)
Observations 45,092 45,092 45,092 45,092
Number of groups 54 54 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood, men,
odds ratios
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.814*** 1.817*** 1.807***
(0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Tertiary 0.844*** 0.846*** 0.846***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.224*** 1.210*** 1.218***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.079)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.495*** 0.497*** 0.495***
(0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.038 1.035 1.034
(0.048) (0.046) (0.047)
Age 0.964*** 0.966*** 0.965***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.053 1.056
(0.081) (0.080)
Gender equity 0.994* 0.995
(0.003) (0.003)
Gender equity2 1.000**
(0.000)
Constant 0.074*** 0.303*** 0.292*** 0.321***
(0.004) (0.068) (0.071) (0.079)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.379*** 0.333*** 0.323*** 0.305***
(0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
Observations 38,887 38,887 38,887 38,887
Number of groups 54 54 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Figure 4 displays the predicted probabilities of lifelong singlehood corresponding
to different levels of gender equity. In the left panel we take estimations from Table 4
and  in  the  right  panel  from  Table  5,  where  gender  equity  and  its  squared  term  are
included as covariates. This allows us to predict the probability of lifelong singlehood
corresponding to different levels of gender equity, ranging from about 40% to almost
100%. The inverted U-shaped relation between gender equity and singlehood is
observed for both genders.
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Figure 4: Predicted probabilities of lifelong singlehood by levels of gender
equity with 95% confidence intervals
a) Women b) Men
4.2 Interaction effects
Models 6 and 7 in Tables 6 and 7 report the interaction effects of education with the
contextual variable. This serves to test hypothesis 3: whether the level of gender equity
is particularly influential for highly educated women’s and low-educated men’s
propensities to remain lifelong single.18
Here again we obtain a better fit with the inclusion of the squared term for gender
equity. Focusing on women, Model 7 in Table 6 shows a statistically significant
interaction effect between gender equity (squared) and education. Contrary to
expectations, it turns out that gender equity (squared) is significant for all educational
levels; the results confirm an inverse U-shaped impact of gender equity. The results are
somewhat  different  for  men  (Model  7  in  Table  7):  As  with  women,  we  observe  the
inverted U-shaped effect for the medium- and highly educated men, but not for the low-
educated ones.
18 We conducted robustness checks by including the GDP measure, but this does not influence our results in
any way. Results are available upon request.
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Table 6: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood with
interaction effects, women, odds ratios
Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.497*** 1.515***
(0.114) (0.115)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.767*** 0.762***
(0.070) (0.070)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.159** 1.160**
(0.069) (0.069)
Age 0.994 0.994
(0.006) (0.006)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.120 1.126
(0.090) (0.088)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.085 1.064
(0.072) (0.090)
Tertiary 1.657*** 1.717***
(0.095) (0.129)
Gender equity 0.993 0.995
(0.005) (0.005)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.996 0.997
(0.005) (0.005)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 0.996 0.997
(0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999***
(0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000
(0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.023*** 0.032***
(0.008) (0.010)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.480*** 0.422***
(0.057) (0.051)
Observations 45,092 45,092
Number of groups 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table 7: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood with
interactions, men, odds ratios
Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.206*** 1.217***
0.078 0.079
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.498*** 0.497***
0.046 0.046
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.029 1.028
0.047 0.047
Age 0.965*** 0.966***
0.005 0.005
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.054 1.061
0.082 0.081
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.814*** 1.661***
0.090 0.109
Tertiary 0.833*** 0.847**
0.046 0.061
Gender equity 0.996 0.996
0.004 0.003
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.990*** 0.991***
0.003 0.003
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 1.004 1.005
0.004 0.004
Gender equity2 0.999***
0.000
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000**
0.000
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000
0.000
Constant 0.293*** 0.329***
0.072 0.081
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.331*** 0.317***
0.042 0.041
Observations 38,887 38,887
Number of groups 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
To facilitate interpretation, Figure 5 plots the predicted probabilities of remaining
unpartnered for women by education across levels of gender equity. We note that the
relationship between gender equity and singlehood is initially positive and then
negative for all levels of education. Interestingly, if we focus on medium levels of
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gender equity we observe a significant difference between the highly educated and
those educated to low and medium levels. When gender equity assumes values close to
the average, tertiary-educated women have a higher probability of remaining lifelong
single (the predicted probability is about four percentage points higher) compared to the
rest,  while  this  is  not  the  case  for  modest  or  high  levels  of  gender  equity.  In  other
words, the effect of gender equity is consistent with the predictions of hypothesis 3.
This inverted U-shaped curve can be interpreted as follows: the predicted
probability of being lifelong single increases, especially for higher-educated women, in
countries positioned in the early stages of women’s role change. But where support for
gender equity has achieved dominant status the marriage market for highly educated
women improves and, as a consequence, the probability of finding an acceptable match
is higher.
Figure 5: Predicted probabilities of lifelong singlehood by education and levels
of gender equity with 95% confidence intervals, women
Figure 6 plots the predicted probability of lifelong singlehood by education and
levels of gender equity for men (hypothesis 3). Here we observe that men educated to
high and medium levels follow a pattern similar to that of women. This is not the case
for low-educated men, who appear to have better chances of finding a partner where the
level of gender equity is high. In other words, the higher the level of equity, the more
likely it is for low-educated men to find a partner.
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Figure 6: Predicted probabilities of lifelong singlehood by education and levels
of gender equity with 95% confidence intervals, men
5. Additional robustness checks
We include a number of additional checks to further assess the robustness of our results.
We first examine whether the exclusion of the EVS data affects our results. As reported
in  Tables  A-8 and A-9,  this  is  not  the  case  –  although some coefficients  become less
statistically significant.
Secondly, we check whether our findings change when adding an aggregate
variable, the female graduation rate, which may be an important predictor of the
probability of lifelong singlehood. Inclusion of this control does not change our original
results (see Tables A-10 and A-11).
We then add a robustness check by altering the period breakdowns of the gender
equity variables (to 1989–1992 and 1993–1999 instead of 1989–1999 and 2000–2010).
This implies that we are tapping into gender equity attitudes when most of the
respondents were in their first union, namely aged 20–45 (or on average in their early
30s). Due to data limitations, we cannot capture the conditions when they were in their
early  20s,  which,  as  previous  research  shows,  would  better  coincide  with  first  union
formation (see Billari and Liefbroer 2010). As reported in Tables A-12 and A-13, even
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if our analysis focuses on a restricted number of countries, our results are not affected
by this alternative time specification.
And finally we test the quality of the gender equity variable by constructing an
index based on three items on gender-related attitudes available in the data that were
chosen because they form part of the first component (with the higher relative weight in
the total variance: more than 70% of the total) of a principal component analysis (PCA).
The first is the same item that was used in the previous analysis and refers to the
following statement: “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than
women,” recoding individual responses in a dummy variable in which “disagree” is
coded as 1, whereas the other responses are coded as 0. The second item refers to the
statement, “A preschool child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works” (recoded as
the first). The third is based on the following statement: “A job is all right but what
most women really want is a home and children” (also recoded as the first). We then
constructed a combined index based on the average (by country and period) of the
estimated percentages for the three indicators. One limitation of the data related to this
combined index is a somewhat smaller sample (50 instead of 54 country–periods). As
reported in Tables A-14 and A-15, results using this index turn out to be very similar to
the ones based solely on the first indicator – but with one exception: namely that the U-
shaped relationship here is clearly driven by higher-educated women.
6. Conclusions and discussion
Lifelong singlehood may account for a minority within the overall household mix. But
to the extent that variations across time and countries help us understand evolving
partnering dynamics it has significant analytical potential.
Opting out of partnerships is no doubt motivated by a host of idiosyncratic factors
that  are  very  difficult  to  nail  down using  the  kind  of  data  that  is  available  to  us.  Our
starting point, however, is the surprising degree of variation in its prevalence across
countries, since the probability of being single is five times higher in Ireland than it is in
Denmark. What explains cross-country variation in the individual probability of being
lifelong single?
In the quest for an explanation, this study has drawn on recent theoretical attempts
to explain the demographic consequences of the ongoing revolution in women’s roles,
in particular the multiple equilibrium approach developed by Esping-Andersen and
Billari (2015) and the work of Goldscheider, Bernhardt, and Lappegård (2015). In a
nutshell, the multiple equilibrium model would suggest that lifelong singlehood is rare
where traditional gender norms prevail. In societies where women’s role change has
accelerated but gender norms have failed to adapt, partnering chances are expected to
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be lower. But where gender egalitarianism has gained firm normative acceptance across
the population we should observe a return to significantly lower rates of lifelong
singlehood. The dynamics are initially driven by the erosion of the traditional male-
breadwinner family. In its wake we are likely to encounter a pervasive degree of
normative uncertainty and confusion. A new and stable equilibrium will, in this
theoretical framework, emerge once gender-egalitarian norms have effectively
permeated society.
We hypothesized that these dynamics would unfold differently by gender
according to levels of education. It was of course higher-educated women who
spearheaded the female revolution, opting for lifelong careers (Bertrand, Kamenica, and
Pan 2013). And, unsurprisingly, it was also this section of the population that was in the
vanguard of rising couple instability, divorce, and fertility decline. But it is within this
very same social group that we should expect new gender-egalitarian values to first take
hold. Accordingly, we hypothesized inverse U-shaped dynamics of lifelong singlehood
that should be most marked for higher-educated women.
On the male side of the coin, we expected a similar trend, but also a linear negative
effect of the diffusion of gender egalitarianism on the odds of being never partnered for
low-educated men. The theoretical reasoning is that women in gender-egalitarian
societies may prioritize characteristics of potential partners other than their
breadwinning capacity. Given the increased career commitment of women and the
associated command of economic resources, women may be more inclined to value
men in terms of the degree to which they adhere to gender egalitarianism (see also
Anderson and Kohler 2015).
It is arguably our inability to trace such dynamics over a longer historical time
period that constitutes the most important limitation of this study. Our second-best
option was to exploit variations in the cross-section of contemporary European nations
(although the time period we could analyze did indeed reveal significant shifts in a
number of countries). This said, we believe that the evidence demonstrates quite clearly
that the odds of being lifelong single peak within those societies where traditional
gender values have waned but gender egalitarianism remains poorly diffused.
As noted, differences across levels of education are of central importance in testing
the (inverse) U-shaped dynamics. We hypothesized that highly educated women would
be especially likely to opt for singlehood in an unstable equilibrium, that is, where there
is widespread normative confusion about proper gender roles. As we expected, we
found higher levels of partnering for the higher-educated where gender egalitarianism
becomes normatively dominant. This scenario was also confirmed in our analysis, but
with one important rider – namely that the same obtains for all women.
For low-educated men we find that in counties characterized by greater support for
gender equity their likelihood of lifelong singlehood is lower. This last result is
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particularly interesting because it seems to partly contrast with the traditional
perspective according to which low-status and low-income men are penalized in the
marriage market (Oppenheimer 1997). Even if this penalization persists also in gender-
egalitarian societies, it is relatively weaker, implying that men’s economic resources
have become less important for their partnering chances.
 There is obviously no law of nature that dictates that all societies will eventually
settle into a new, stable gender-egalitarian equilibrium – and thereby possibly reap
dividends. In fact, recent research on the situation in the United States concludes that
the female revolution may have stalled midway (Cotter, Hermesen, and Vanneman
2011; England 2010). What’s more, the embrace of gender-egalitarian attitudes does
not necessarily imply a concomitant adoption of egalitarian practices within the
partnership. In this sense, the progress toward gender egalitarianism in couple
arrangements may be comparatively slower than the diffusion of values and preferences
in favor of gender symmetry in paid and unpaid work within couples. And the inability
to adopt gender-egalitarian couple arrangements may arrest the consolidation of a new
stable equilibrium. Here the country-specific institutional context may play a key role.
The adoption of gender-egalitarian practices is likely to advance further in societies
with strong welfare state support for families, such as high-quality childcare.
Our inability to trace these institutional dynamics over many decades and cohorts
is, as noted, a major limitation. Indeed, this is arguably a sine qua non if we aim to fully
test the validity of the inverted-U thesis. One promising next step would be to exploit
very long national panel datasets, such as the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) or
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), or alternatively data which reconstructs
life  histories  for  different  birth  cohorts,  such as  the  Generations  and Gender  Surveys,
nested in different institutional contexts.
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Appendix
Table A-1: Structure of the data: individuals aged 40–55 by gender, pooled data
from ESS and EVS
Women Men
First period Second period First period Second period
AT 1,494 276 1,177 253
BE 1,312 765 1,200 729
BG 777 644 564 558
CH 1,362 659 1,186 646
CZ 1,046 635 1,023 580
DE 2,154 1,323 2,047 1,384
DK 1,118 668 1,112 660
EE 794 881 542 653
ES 1,230 569 1,067 549
FI 1,041 517 992 541
FR 781 786 735 731
GB 1,357 644 1,178 516
GR – 441 – 295
HR 446 198 321 192
HU 1,097 486 1,000 419
IE 1,332 732 985 545
IS 194 109 194 90
IT 423 134 383 117
LT – 572 – 387
LV 875 – 535 –
NL 1,547 900 1,197 720
NO 1,199 597 1,312 717
PL 1,279 644 1,190 632
PT 1,345 606 887 395
RO 541 – 407 –
SE 1,021 654 1,041 620
SI 1,031 550 864 461
SK 1,004 567 841 450
UA 1,141 594 722 345
Total 28,941 16,151 24,702 14,185
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Table A-2: Questions used to define lifelong singlehood
Questions
ESS
Round 1
ESS
Round 2
ESS
Round 3
ESS
Round 4
ESS5
Round 5
ESS
Round 6
ESS
Round 7
EVS
2008–
2009
Could I ask about your current legal marital status?
Which of the descriptions on this card applies to you?
Married, separated, divorced, widowed, never
married, refusal, don’t know, no answer
X X
Could I ask about your current legal marital status?
Which of the descriptions on this card applies to you?
Married, in a civil partnership, separated (still legally
married), separated (still in a civil partnership),
divorced, widowed, formerly in a civil partnership now
dissolved, formerly in a civil partnership died, never
married and never in a civil partnership, refusal, don’t
know, no answer
X X
Could I ask about your current legal marital status?
Which of the descriptions on this card applies to you?
Legally married, in a legally registered union, legally
separated, legally divorced/civil divorced, widowed,
none of these (never married or in a legally registered
civil union), refusal, don’t know, no answer
X X X
Have you ever lived with a spouse or partner for
three months or more?
X
Have you ever lived with a partner without being
married?
X X X X
Have you ever lived with a partner without being
married to them?
X X X
Are you currently living with your husband/wife? X X
Are you currently living with your husband/wife/civil
partner?
X X
Are you currently living with a partner? X X X X
Are you currently living with your husband/wife/
partner?
X X X
Have you ever been divorced? X X X X
Have you ever been divorced/had a civil union
dissolved?
X X X
Are you or have you ever been married? X
What is your current legal marital status? Other
missing question not asked, not applicable, no
answer, don’t know, married, registered partnership,
widowed, divorced, separated, never married and
never registered partnership
X
Did you live together with your partner before your
marriage or before the registration of your
partnership?
X
Do you live with a partner? X
Did you live with a partner before? X
Were you married to this partner or did you have a
registered partnership with this partner?
X
Who, apart from you, is living in this household?
Partner, husband or wife?
X
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Table A-3: Correlation matrix, macro variables
Gender equity Sex ratio in graduation
Gender equity
Sex ratio in graduation 0.059
Female graduation rate 0.316 0.262
Table A-4: Results of multilevel models with three levels (individual, country–
periods, and country), women
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.076 1.077 1.078
(0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Tertiary 1.661*** 1.662*** 1.660***
(0.095) (0.095) (0.095)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.482*** 1.471*** 1.490***
(0.111) (0.111) (0.113)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.768*** 0.767*** 0.766***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.070)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.154** 1.154** 1.156**
(0.069) (0.069) (0.069)
Age 0.991* 0.995 0.995
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.142 1.133
(0.092) (0.090)
Gender equity 0.996 0.994
(0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999**
(0.000)
Constant 0.041*** 0.031*** 0.026*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.215*** 0.237*** 0.237*** 0.280***
(0.055) (0.055) (0.058) (0.065)
Level-3 standard deviation of random effect 0.422*** 0.438*** 0.425*** 0.320***
(0.073) (0.077) (0.079) (0.083)
Observations 45,092 45,092 45,092 45,092
Number of groups (level 2) 54 54 54 54
Number of groups (level 3) 29 29 29 29
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-5: Results of multilevel models with three levels (individual, country–
periods, and country), men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.805*** 1.805*** 1.797***
(0.089) (0.089) (0.089)
Tertiary 0.845*** 0.846*** 0.844***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.208*** 1.201*** 1.207***
(0.076) (0.077) (0.078)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.496*** 0.497*** 0.497***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.033 1.032 1.032
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Age 0.964*** 0.966*** 0.966***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.092 1.085
(0.087) (0.086)
Gender equity 0.998 0.997
(0.003) (0.003)
Gender equity2 1.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.0733*** 0.305*** 0.275*** 0.298***
(0.005) (0.070) (0.069) (0.075)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.142*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.152***
(0.048) (0.049) (0.051) (0.053)
Level-3 standard deviation of random effect 0.361*** 0.320*** 0.319*** 0.282***
(0.06) (0.060) (0.062) (0.063)
Observations 38,887 38,887 38,887 38,887
Number of groups 54 54 54 54
Number of groups 29 29 29 29
Notes: *** p<0.01
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Table A-6: Results of multilevel models with three levels (individual, country–
periods, and country), interactions, women
Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.474*** 1.493***
(0.112) (0.113)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.768*** 0.765***
(0.070) (0.070)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.154** 1.156**
(0.069) (0.069)
Age 0.995 0.995
(0.006) (0.006)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.142 1.133
(0.092) (0.090)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.068 1.048
(0.071) (0.089)
Tertiary 1.652*** 1.703***
(0.095) (0.128)
Gender equity 0.999 0.996
(0.005) (0.005)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.995 0.997
(0.005) (0.005)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 0.996 0.997
(0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999**
(0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000
(0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.026*** 0.030***
(0.008) (0.010)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.236*** 0.279***
(0.058) (0.065)
Level-3 standard deviation of random effect 0.424*** 0.321***
(0.078) (0.084)
Observations 45,092 45,092
Number of groups 54 54
Number of groups 29 29
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table A-7: Results of multilevel models with three levels (individual, country–
periods, and country), interactions, men
Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.198*** 1.206***
(0.077) (0.078)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.498*** 0.499***
(0.046) (0.046)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.027 1.026
(0.047) (0.047)
Age 0.967*** 0.966***
(0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.101 1.094
(0.089) (0.088)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.802*** 1.653***
(0.089) (0.108)
Tertiary 0.831*** 0.835**
(0.046) (0.060)
Gender equity 1.000 0.998
(0.003) (0.003)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.990*** 0.991***
(0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 1.004 1.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 1.000*
(0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000**
(0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000
(0.000)
Constant 0.273*** 0.299***
(0.068) (0.076)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.132*** 0.154***
(0.051) (0.053)
Level-3 standard deviation of random effect 0.330*** 0.297***
(0.063) (0.065)
Observations 38,887 38,887
Number of groups 54 54
Number of groups 29 29
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-8: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level, individual characteristics, and
country-level variables, women and men, odds ratios (only ESS)
Women Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.116 1.119 1.114 1.842*** 1.846*** 1.836***
(0.081) (0.081) (0.081) (0.098) (0.098) (0.098)
Tertiary 1.706*** 1.712*** 1.711*** 0.861** 0.864** 0.863**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.107) (0.050) (0.051) (0.051)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.812** 0.813** 0.808** 0.490*** 0.492*** 0.491***
(0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.184** 1.178** 1.179** 1.050 1.046 1.045
(0.078) (0.078) (0.077) (0.052) (0.051) (0.051)
Age 0.991 0.994 0.994 0.964*** 0.965*** 0.965***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.108 1.115 1.072 1.076
(0.091) (0.089) (0.086) (0.085)
Gender equity 0.993 0.992* 0.995 0.995*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender equity2 0.999*** 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.038*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.047*** 0,0402*** 0.0302*** 0.0261*** 0.0321***
(0.003) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014) (0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)
Level-2 standard deviation of random
effect 0.464*** 0.470*** 0.461*** 0.408*** 0.476*** 0.495*** 0.481*** 0.422***
(0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.051) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.051)
Observations 38,887 38,887 38,887 38,887 34,007 34,007 34,007 34,007
Number of groups 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-9: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level and country-level interactions, women
and men, odds ratios (only ESS)
Women Men
Model 6 Model 7 Model 6 Model 7
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.814** 0.807** 0.494*** 0.492***
(0.079) (0.078) (0.048) (0.048)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.179** 1.180** 1.041 1.040
(0.078) (0.078) (0.051) (0.051)
Age 0.994 0.994 0.965*** 0.965***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.106 1.115 1.074 1.081
(0.091) (0.089) (0.087) (0.086)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.112 1.083 1.840*** 1.700***
(0.081) (0.099) (0.098) (0.119)
Tertiary 1.705*** 1.801*** 0.851*** 0.858**
(0.107) (0.145) (0.050) (0.066)
Gender equity 0.814** 0.807** 0.997 0.996
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.994 0.995 0.989*** 0.990***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 0.994 0.995 1.004 1.005
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999*** 0.999**
(0.000) (0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000 1.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.039*** 0.047*** 0.350*** 0.393***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.086) (0.098)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.460*** 0.407*** 0.333*** 0.324***
(0.057) (0.051) (0.044) (0.043)
Observations 38,887 38,887 34,007 34,007
Number of groups 54 54 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-10: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level, individual characteristics, and
country-level variables, women and men, odds ratios. Inclusion of the
macro variable female graduated rate
Women Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.091 1.093 1.087 1.814*** 1.819*** 1.808***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
Tertiary 1.660*** 1.668*** 1.667*** 0.844*** 0.847*** 0.845***
(0.095) (0.096) (0.096) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.512*** 1.493*** 1.512*** 1.224*** 1.210*** 1.218***
(0.114) (0.113) (0.114) (0.078) (0.078) (0.078)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.765*** 0.768*** 0.765*** 0.495*** 0.496*** 0.494***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.0701) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.162** 1.159** 1.161** 1.038 1.035 1.034
(0.069) (0.069) (0.0692) (0.048) (0.047) (0.047)
Age 0.991* 0.992 0.992 0.964*** 0.966*** 0.966***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.00501)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.125 1.132 1.047 1.051
(0.090) (0.088) (0.0819) (0.081)
Female graduated rate 0.996 0.994 1.003 1.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005)
Gender equity 0.992* 0.992* 0.994* 0.994*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender equity2 0.999*** 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.0402*** 0.0302*** 0.0282*** 0.0358*** 0.074*** 0.306*** 0.274*** 0.307***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.009) (0.012) (0.004) (0.069) (0.073) (0.082)
Level-2 standard deviation of random
effect 0.476*** 0.495*** 0.478*** 0.417*** 0.379*** 0.333*** 0.323*** 0.305***
(0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.050) (0.045) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040)
Observations 45,092 45,092 45,092 45,092 38,887 38,887 38,887 38,887
Number of groups 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-11: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level and country-level interactions, women
and men, odds ratios. Inclusion of the macro variable female
graduated rate
Women Men
Model 6 Model 7 Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.496*** 1.514*** 1.207*** 1.217***
(0.113) (0.115) (0.078) (0.079)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.768*** 0.764*** 0.497*** 0.496***
(0.070) (0.070) (0.046) (0.045)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.160** 1.161** 1.029 1.028
(0.069) (0.069) (0.047) (0.047)
Age 0.992 0.992 0.967*** 0.967***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.125 1.133 1.046 1.055
(0.090) (0.088) (0.083) (0.082)
Female graduated rate 0.995 0.994 1.004 1.003
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.079 1.057 1.798*** 1.649***
(0.072) (0.089) (0.089) (0.108)
Tertiary 1.652*** 1.714*** 0.836*** 0.852**
(0.096) (0.128) (0.046) (0.061)
Gender equity 0.994 0.994 0.995 0.995
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.996 0.997 0.990*** 0.992**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 0.996 0.996 1.004 1.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999*** 0.999***
(0.000) (0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Gender gap in equity
Primary ≥ Gender gap in equity
Tertiary ≥ Gender gap in equity
Constant 0.027*** 0.036*** 0.273*** 0.310***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.073) (0.084)
Level-2 standard deviation of random effect 0.477*** 0.417*** 0.330*** 0.316***
(0.056) (0.050) (0.042) (0.041)
Observations 45,092 45,092 38,887 38,887
Number of groups 54 54 54 54
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table A-12: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level, individual characteristics, and
country-level variables, women and men, odds ratios. Change of
periods for gender equity indicator, 1989–1992 and 1993–
1999
Women Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.054 1.059 1.054 1.826*** 1.839*** 1.834***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.092) (0.093) (0.093)
Tertiary 1.647*** 1.657*** 1.655*** 0.857*** 0.865** 0.864**
(0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.544*** 1.531*** 1.543*** 1.211*** 1.196*** 1.199***
(0.123) (0.122) (0.123) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.792** 0.794** 0.790** 0.516*** 0.519*** 0.518***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.076) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.177*** 1.173*** 1.175*** 1.030 1.026 1.026
(0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Age 0.992 0.996 0.996 0.966*** 0.967*** 0.967***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.127 1.133 1.059 1.062
(0.091) (0.091) (0.081) (0.081)
Gender equity 0.990** 0.992* 0.990*** 0.991***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender equity2 0.999*** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.040*** 0.028*** 0.023*** 0.027*** 0.076*** 0.290*** 0.275*** 0.285***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.067) (0.068) (0.071)
Level-2 standard deviation of random
effect 0.489*** 0.508*** 0.491*** 0.456*** 0.370*** 0.319*** 0.291*** 0.289***
(0.060) (0.062) (0.060) (0.056) (0.045) (0.042) (0.040) (0.039)
Observations 41,602 41,602 41,602 41,602 36,251 36,251 36,251 36,251
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A-13: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level and country-level interactions, women
and men, odds ratios. Change of periods for gender equity indicator,
1989–1992 and 1993–1999
Women Men
Model 6 Model 7 Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.536*** 1.548*** 1.193*** 1.199***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.080) (0.081)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.795** 0.790** 0.520*** 0.520***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.050) (0.050)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.175*** 1.177*** 1.020 1.019
(0.073) (0.073) (0.048) (0.048)
Age 0.996 0.996 0.967*** 0.967***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.126 1.133 1.059 1.066
(0.091) (0.090) (0.081) (0.081)
Female graduated rate 1.536*** 1.548*** 1.193*** 1.199***
(0.122) (0.123) (0.080) (0.081)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.053 1.046 1.829*** 1.667***
(0.072) (0.090) (0.093) (0.109)
Tertiary 1.649*** 1.693*** 0.850*** 0.863**
(0.099) (0.129) (0.049) (0.063)
Gender equity 0.992 0.994 0.992** 0.992**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity 0.998 0.998 0.990*** 0.991***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity 0.995 0.996 1.003 1.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity2 0.999** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity2 1.000 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.278*** 0.294***
(0.007) (0.009) (0.069) (0.074)
Level-2 standard deviation of random
effect
0.488*** 0.454*** 0.299*** 0.298***
(0.059) (0.056) (0.040) (0.040)
Observations 41,602 41,602 36,251 36,251
Number of groups 50 50 50 50
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table A-14: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level, individual characteristics, and
country-level variables, women and men, odds ratios. Inclusion of
gender equity index
Women Men
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.059 1.061 1.059 1.836*** 1.837*** 1.831***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.094) (0.094) (0.093)
Tertiary 1.643*** 1.649*** 1.651*** 0.856*** 0.858*** 0.858***
(0.098) (0.099) (0.099) (0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.526*** 1.510*** 1.513*** 1.202*** 1.195*** 1.196***
(0.122) (0.121) (0.121) (0.081) (0.081) (0.081)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.792** 0.792** 0.792** 0.509*** 0.510*** 0.510***
(0.077) (0.077) (0.077) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.181*** 1.179*** 1.178*** 1.017 1.016 1.015
(0.073) (0.073) (0.073) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
Age 0.992 0.995 0.996 0.966*** 0.968*** 0.968***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.134 1.146* 1.075 1.086
(0.091) (0.091) (0.084) (0.084)
Gender equity Index 0.994 0.994 0.997 0.998
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Gender equity Index 2 1.000** 1.000**
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.027*** 0.0757*** 0.291*** 0.268*** 0.287***
(0.003) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) (0.068) (0.068) (0.073)
Level-2 standard deviation of random
effect
0.473*** 0.493*** 0.481*** 0.454*** 0.375*** 0.330*** 0.328*** 0.314***
(0.058) (0.061) (0.059) (0.057) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042)
Observations 41,122 41,122 41,122 41,122 35,617 35,617 35,617 35,617
Number of groups 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05
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Table A-15: Results of multilevel logistic regression of lifelong singlehood on
respondent’s educational level and country-level interactions, women
and men, odds ratios. Inclusion of gender equity index
Women Men
Model 6 Model 7 Model 6 Model 7
Dataset (ESS: ref.) 1.513*** 1.510*** 1.189** 1.190**
(0.121) (0.121) (0.081) (0.081)
Immigrant (Native: ref.) 0.793** 0.788** 0.511*** 0.512***
(0.077) (0.076) (0.050) (0.050)
With religious background (Without: ref.) 1.181*** 1.180*** 1.009 1.007
(0.073) (0.073) (0.048) (0.048)
Age 0.995 0.996 0.968*** 0.968***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Sex ratio, graduates in tertiary education 1.134 1.146* 1.075 1.089
(0.091) (0.091) (0.085) (0.085)
Female graduated rate 1.513*** 1.510*** 1.189** 1.190**
(0.121) (0.121) (0.081) (0.081)
Educational level (Upper sec.: ref.)
Lower sec. or below 1.059 1.039 1.834*** 1.621***
(0.072) (0.091) (0.093) (0.105)
Tertiary 1.648*** 1.845*** 0.835*** 0.820***
(0.099) (0.142) (0.049) (0.060)
Gender equity index 0.994 0.996 1.000 1.000
(0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity index 1.000 1.001 0.989*** 0.991***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity index 0.998 0.997 1.003 1.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Gender equity index2 1.000 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Primary education ≥ Gender equity index2 1.000 1.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Tertiary education ≥ Gender equity index2 1.000** 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.025*** 0.027*** 0.270*** 0.300***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.069) (0.077)
Level-2 standard deviation of random
effect
0.479*** 0.451*** 0.342*** 0.330***
(0.059) (0.057) (0.045) (0.044)
Observations 41,122 41,122 35,617 35,617
Number of groups 50 50 50 50
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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